OpenAIR OpenAIR
 
 

OpenAIR @ RGU >
Business >
Management >
Journal articles (Management) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10059/276
This item has been viewed 116 times in the last year. View Statistics

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
JBFA2003 ptp match accepted.pdf110.72 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Title: Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the market for corporate control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in the UK.
Authors: Weir, Charlie
Laing, David
Wright, Mike
Keywords: Public to private transactions
Incentives
Monitoring
Market for corporate control
Issue Date: Jun-2005
Publisher: Blackwell
Citation: WEIR, C., LAING, D. and WRIGHT, M., 2005. Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the market for corporate control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in the UK. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32 (5-6), pp. 909-943.
Abstract: This paper investigates the factors that influence the decision to change the status of a publicly quoted company to that of a private company. We find that firms that go private are more likely to have higher CEO ownership and higher institutional ownership. In relation to their board structures, firms going private tend to have more duality but there is no statistical difference in the proportion of non‐executive directors. They do not show signs of having excess free cash flows but there is some evidence of lower growth opportunities. We do not find that firms going private experience a greater threat of hostile acquisition. The results are therefore consistent with incentive and monitoring explanations of going private. Calculation of the probability of going private shows that incentive effects are stronger than the monitoring effects.
ISSN: 0306-686X
Appears in Collections:Journal articles (Management)

All items in OpenAIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

 

 
   Disclaimer | Freedom of Information | Privacy Statement |Copyright ©2012 Robert Gordon University, Schoolhill, Aberdeen, AB10 1FR, Scotland, UK: a Scottish charity, registration No. SCO13781